We analyze the problem of allocating cost savings from sharing demand information in a three-level supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer. To …nd a unique allocation scheme we use concepts from cooperative game theory. First, we compute analytically the expected cost incurred by the manufacturer and then use simulation to obtain expected costs for the distributor and the retailer. We construct a three-person cooperative game in characteristic-function form, and derive necessary conditions for the stability of each of …ve possible coalitions. To divide the cost savings between two members, or among three supply chain members, we use various allocation schemes. We present numerical analyses to investigate the impacts of demand autocorrelation coe¢ cient, , and the unit holding and shortage costs on the allocation scheme.
Introduction
In recent years, academics and practitioners have begun paying considerable attention to e¢ cient management of supply chains involving material, information and …nancial ‡ows. As Chopra and Meindl [7, p. 36] have indicated, the primary goal of an e¢ cient supply chain is to meet customers' demands at the lowest cost. Hence, in order to achieve supply chain e¢ ciency, each channel member is expected to pay attention to cost savings by, for example, collaborating on supply chain integration (SCI). As shown by Lee [16] , information sharing plays a signi…cant role in integrating a supply chain. Information shared by supply chain members mainly consists of demand information, inventory-related data, order status and production schedules (Lee and Whang [15] ). As demonstrated in many articles, supply chain-wide information sharing can result in lower overall costs, whereas the lack of information sharing may have a negative impact on the supply chain performance. For example, the well-known phenomenon known as the "bullwhip e¤ect" usually appears in a supply chain as a result of information distortion and can result in higher inventory levels, longer lead times and consequently lower supply chain pro…tability.
Many industries have experienced or hope to experience demonstrable bene…ts from information
sharing. In a report on potential impacts of the e-commerce on the U.S. healthcare supply chain (HSC) prepared by the accounting and consulting …rm Ernst and Young, it was indicated that cost savings generated by e¢ cient information sharing could amount to US$2.6 billion; see, Hankin [11] .
Another accounting and consulting …rm Andersen also presented an industrial report [14] concerned with the value of e-commerce in HSC. In this study, Andersen obtained the same conclusion as Ernst and Young, and further estimated that information sharing could yield cost savings of US$3.9 billion. As discussed in Chopra and Meindl [7] , Wal-Mart and Proctor & Gamble (P&G) also gained considerable bene…ts from sharing information on the point-of-sale (POS) data.
Demand data from ultimate customers, i.e., POS, is a most important piece of information that is worth sharing. As reported in [1] , Dan DiMaggio, president of the UPS Supply Chain Solutions, has indicated that sharing sales data can help reduce inventories and accelerate ful…llment. Lee, So and Tang [17] (hereafter, LST) quanti…ed the bene…ts of sharing demand information in a two-level supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer. LST assumed that customer demands faced by the retailer follow the one-period autoregressive model AR(1), i.e.,
where D t represents the customer demand in period t, d is a positive constant, is the autocorrelation parameter with j j 1, and " t is the error term that is i.i.d. with a symmetric distribution (e.g., normal) having mean 0 and variance 2 . The demand process (1) for studying the bullwhip e¤ect was adopted as early as 1987 by Kahn [12] , and in recent years it has been frequently applied to the analysis of the bullwhip e¤ect and information sharing. For example, Chen et al. [5] quanti…ed the bullwhip e¤ect, caused by demand forecasting and order lead times, in a two-stage supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer who faces the demand process AR (1) . These authors also extended their analysis to multiple-stage supply chains with and without demand information sharing between the retailer and his upstream members, and they showed that the bullwhip e¤ect can be reduced but cannot be completely eliminated by information sharing. Chen, Ryan and Simchi-Levi [6] considered two demand processes, AR(1) and a demand process with a linear trend, and they quantitatively analyzed the bullwhip e¤ect for two-stage supply chains consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. In [6] , the retailer was assumed to use the exponential smoothing and moving average forecasting techniques to update the mean and standard deviation of demand and thus the retailer's order-up-to point for each period. The authors demonstrated that using exponential smoothing results in a larger bullwhip e¤ect than using the moving average, and also discussed several important managerial insights drawn from this research.
In our paper, we use (1) to model the demand process faced by the retailer, compute cost savings generated by information sharing and conduct a cooperative game analysis for the fair allocation of cost savings in a three-level supply chain. LST [17] provided empirical evidence to show that for most products the autocorrelation coe¢ cient is positive. When = 0, the AR(1) process is reduced to D t = d + " t which does not depend on the past demand information owned by the retailer. In this case, end-demand information sharing does not change the distributor's and the manufacturer's ordering decisions and does not reduce their costs. Thus, for our analysis we let 0 < 1.
A number of papers have focused on the impact of information sharing on cost reduction in sup-ply chains. For example, in two recent publications Simchi-Levi and Zhao ( [29] and [30] ) investigated the value of demand information sharing in a two-stage supply chain (including a manufacturer and a retailer) with production capacity constraints over a …nite and an in…nite time horizon, respectively. More speci…cally, in [29] , the authors analyzed the value of information sharing between a retailer facing the i.i.d. demand and a manufacturer with a …nite production capacity over a …nite time horizon. Simchi-Levi and Zhao considered three strategies, i.e., no information sharing, information sharing with optimal policy, and information sharing with greedy policy, and studied the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer and found the optimal timing for information sharing. The authors concluded that by sharing demand information, the manufacturer can achieve a considerable reduction of inventory cost while assuring the same service level to the retailer. In [30] , the authors examined the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer's cost and service level for the in…nite horizon case. Allowing for time-varying cost functions, the paper characterized the manufacturer's optimal production-inventory policy with information sharing under both the discounted and average cost criteria, and identi…ed situations under which information sharing is most bene…cial.
There appear to be very few papers that have analyzed the information sharing problem from a game-theoretic point-of-view and investigated the problem of allocating cost savings generated by information sharing among channel members. Furthermore, the existing papers emphasizing allocation schemes only studied two-echelon supply chains; see, e.g., Raghunathan [26] . In this paper, we consider a three-level supply chain involving a manufacturer (M), a distributor (D) and a retailer (R), and we restrict our attention to allocating cost savings among supply chain members when they form a coalition for information sharing. In particular, when some supply chain members collaborate for demand information sharing and jointly achieve cost savings, we consider the question of fairly dividing the cost savings in order to keep them in the coalition.
Under a fair allocation scheme, all members in a coalition are better o¤ than before joining the coalition; otherwise, one or more supply chain members could leave the coalition. One may note that in the real business world, lack of trust between supply chain members could also prevent the members from joining the coalition. Since our paper focuses on the fair allocation of cost savings between supply chain members, we are assuming that all supply chain members trust one another.
Under this assumption, once a fair allocation is made to all members in a coalition, these members would be willing to stay with the coalition and allocate total cost savings according to the fair scheme.
In the supply chain under study, the distributor procures …nal products from the manufacturer, and distributes the products to satisfy the orders placed by the retailer who then meets the demands of ultimate customers. We compute cost savings achieved through information sharing and construct a three-person cooperative game in characteristic-function form. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that a single product is delivered down the supply chain to satisfy the enddemand. Moreover, we assume that the lead time between the manufacturer and the distributor and the lead time between the distributor and the retailer are both one period. During any time period, each channel member determines an order-up-to level to minimize his expected holding and shortage costs for the next period.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the information sharing and cost savings for di¤erent coalitional structures. Section 3 formulates a three-person information sharing game in characteristic-function form where we …nd necessary conditions for stability of every coalition, and discuss allocation schemes when a two-player coalition or the grand coalition is stable. In Section 4, we consider the implementation of the allocation schemes analyzed in the preceding section, and compute the side payments transferred between two players (when a two-player coalition is stable) and among three players (when the grand coalition is stable). In Section 5, we provide two numerical examples to …nd unique allocation schemes, and present sensitivity analyses to explore the impacts of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient , and the unit holding and shortage costs on the allocation schemes. The paper concludes in Section 6 with a brief summary and some remarks regarding future research.
Information Sharing and Cost Savings for Di¤erent Coalitional Structures
We de…ne the demand information shared by a coalition as the demand data faced by the downstream member in the coalition. For example, the distributor and the manufacturer could form a two-player coalition, where the distributor is the immediate downstream member of the manufacturer. The distributor receives the orders placed by his immediate downstream, i.e., the retailer.
Hence, in this coalition the demand information shared by the distributor and the manufacturer is de…ned as the retailer's order quantity. When three players (i.e., all supply chain members) form a grand coalition, the information shared by them is the sales data at the retailer's level, i.e., the information on ultimate customers'demands, which is obtained by the retailer from the POS information.
In this paper we develop a cooperative game in characteristic-function form and analyze it to …nd the appropriate allocation scheme for "fairly" allocating expected cost savings. In order to …nd the characteristic-function values of various coalitions, we compute total cost savings for each possible coalition in which the participants share demand information faced by their downstream members. The joint cost savings of a coalition are equal to the sum of cost reductions incurred by all members in the coalition. In the supply chain under study, since the manufacturer is the most upstream member, we assume that any production quantity determined by the manufacturer will be realized by his own production schedule. This allows us to compute exactly the manufacturer's expected cost in closed-form.
However, the distributor's and the retailer's orders may not be completely ful…lled by the manufacturer and the distributor, respectively. Speci…cally, whether or not the order placed by the distributor for period t can be satis…ed by the manufacturer depends on the order-up-to level chosen by the manufacturer at the end of the period t 1. For the retailer, the process would be much more complex, since the ful…llment of the retailer's order for the period t + 1 relies on the actual orderup-to level at the distributor at the end of the period t, which also depends on the manufacturer's order-up-to level at the end of the period t 1. Although it may be possible to formulate our models with the (more realistic) assumption of less than 100% …ll-rates, the resulting expressions become too intractable to analyze. For our game modeling and analysis, we use simulation to estimate expected costs of the retailer and the distributor.
In order to …nd a proper scheme of allocating the expected cost savings achieved by an informationsharing coalition, we follow the procedure below:
Step 1 Identify all possible information-sharing coalitional structures for the supply chain;
Step 2 Compute expected costs incurred by the manufacturer in di¤erent information-sharing coalitions;
Step 3 Use simulation to …nd expected costs incurred by the distributor and the retailer in di¤erent information-sharing coalitions;
Step 4 Develop a cooperative game in characteristic-function form in terms of the cost savings for all possible information-sharing coalitions;
Step 5 Analyze the cooperative game to …nd an appropriate solution representing an allocation scheme for the supply chain.
In the remainder of this section we consider Steps 1, 2 and 3, and in Section 3 we implement
Steps 4 and 5. To illustrate Step 1, we refer to Figure 1 that depicts …ve di¤erent possible coalitional structures for information sharing between and among supply chain members. For example, Figure   1 (1) corresponds to the coalitional structure fM; D; Rg where the supply chain members do not share end-demand information. For this case, the expected costs of the manufacturer, the distributor and the retailer are M 1 , D1 and R1 , respectively. Similarly, Figure 1 (2) corresponds to the coalitional structure fM; (DR)g where the distributor receives end-demand information from the retailer. (The fact that the demand information is sent from one supply chain member to another is indicated by the symbol k on the arrows in Figure 1 .) For this case, the expected costs of the manufacturer, the distributor and the retailer are M 2 , D2 and R2 , respectively. The remaining parts (3)-(5) in Figure 1 have a similar interpretation. It is important to note here that in most supply chain collaboration cases, demand information is shared among consecutive echelons in a supply chain. Thus, a coalition such as between the retailer and the manufacturer (which are separated by the distributor in the echelon structure)
is not commonly observed. However, such a coalitional structure can still be justi…ed by considering the following example: The Seven-Eleven Japan's success originates from the fact that the stores transmit their POS transactions data to not only the headquarters but also wholesalers and manufacturers for better production schedule and new product development; see Lee and Whang [15] . Today's information technology (e.g., RFID 1 ) enables the information sharing among all members in a supply chain. Thus, the retailer and the manufacturer may decide to collaborate for end-demand information sharing.
For
Step 2, we compute the manufacturer's expected costs (i.e., M 1 ; : : : ; M 5 ) for all …ve coalitional structures shown in Figure 1 . Calculation of these expected costs requires a knowledge of the distributor's ordering process faced by the manufacturer. Recall that the distributor makes his ordering decisions according to the order process of the retailer who uses the demand process (1) to calculate her optimal order quantities. Hence, to compute the manufacturer's expected costs, we identify the ordering processes of the distributor and the retailer. Our results for the manufacturer's expected costs are provided in Table 1 
As an illustration, consider the coalitional structure fM; D; Rg. To estimate expected costs for this coalition over N periods, we initialize the simulation at the end of period 0 and use the formulas (in Appendix A) to compute order-up-to levels for all three supply chain members under 100% …ll-rate as S M 1 0 , S D1 0 and S R 0 . We also assume that
In each period we randomly generate the error term " t of (1) 
Modeling and Analysis of the Cooperative Game
In our game model, we consider the problem of "fairly"allocating cost savings between two players (if a two-player coalition is stable) or among three players (if the grand coalition is stable). In this paper, the de…nition of "fair allocation" is given as follows:
De…nition 1 In the information-sharing cooperative game, a scheme for allocating cost savings among all supply chain members in a coalition is fair only if all members in the coalition accept the allocation scheme and are willing to stay in the coalition.
An Information Sharing Cooperative Game in Characteristic-Function Form
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [32, Ch. VI] were the …rst to construct a theory of multi-person games where they assumed that various subgroups of players might join together to form coalitions.
As we are considering a three-person game where the supply chain members can form coalitions in the process of sharing demand information, we construct our information sharing game in the characteristic value form. That is, we compute the characteristic values of all possible coalitions,
In the theory of cooperative games, the "characteristic value" is the minimum amount that the coalition can attain using its own e¤orts only. In our paper the characteristic value of a coalition is de…ned as the cost savings that all players in the coalition could achieve under the worst conditions. We compute the characteristic values of all possible coalitions in Appendix B.
Note that the characteristic value of an empty coalition is naturally zero, i.e., v(?) = 0. Our information-sharing cooperative game is thus presented as follows:
Analysis of the Information-Sharing Cooperative Game
We now analyze the cooperative game to investigate the stability of each coalition and to allocate cost savings among players in a stable coalition. A coalition is called "stable" if its members have no incentive to leave the coalition. Naturally, if a coalition is unstable, then the coalition would disperse, so we focus our attention on the allocation schemes that assure stable coalitions. Since the characteristic values for all possible coalitions depend on expected costs, each coalition could be stable under di¤erent conditions. Next, we …nd necessary conditions for stability of every coalition.
Proposition 2
The necessary conditions for stability of each coalition in the cooperative game are given as follows:
and
5. The coalition fM; D; Rg is stable only if any other coalition is unstable.
Major Solution Concepts in the Theory of Cooperative Games
Since we don't need to consider the allocation problem when the coalition fM; D; Rg is stable, we next discuss the commonly-used solution concepts for the two-player games and the three-player games.
Solution Concepts in Two-Player Games When the necessary conditions for stability of a two-player coalition are satis…ed, the coalition is stable if an allocation scheme is "fair" to each player. To assure fairness, we consider the scheme of allocating extra cost savings between two players. Here, the extra cost savings is de…ned as the di¤erence between total cost savings generated by all members in a coalition and the sum of cost savings achieved by these members when they leave the coalition. In the theory of cooperative games, there are several commonly-used game concepts, e.g., egalitarian proposal, negotiation set, Nash arbitration scheme and Shapley value; see Cachon and Netessine [4] , Leng and Parlar [18] and Stra¢ n [31] . The egalitarian proposal suggests that two players in a cooperative game split extra cost savings equally. For our game model we can easily
show that when the necessary conditions for a two-player coalition are satis…ed, the negotiation set is non-empty and it includes many "fair" allocation schemes for two players. However, in our paper we are more interested in …nding a unique allocation scheme. In addition to the egalitarian proposal discussed above, we use Nash arbitration scheme and Shapley value to investigate if any other "fair" unique allocation scheme can be found for our cooperative game.
The concept of Nash arbitration scheme was introduced by Nash [22] . Consider a two-player game with the status quo (x 0 ; y 0 ). This scheme suggests a unique solution (x; y) by solving the constrained nonlinear problem: max (x x 0 )(y y 0 ), subject to x x 0 and y y 0 . Shapley value, developed by Shapley [28] , is a solution concept for cooperative games, which provides a unique imputation and represents the payo¤s distributed "fairly" by an outside arbitrator. For our game, Shapley value is interpreted as a scheme for allocating cost savings between two players or among three players. The unique Shapley values ' = (' 1 ; : : : ; ' n ) are determined by
]=n! where T denotes an information sharing coalition and jT j is the size of T .
Solution Concepts in Three-Player Games We now discuss the allocation scheme when the necessary conditions for stability of the grand coalition f(M DR)g are satis…ed. In particular, if the necessary conditions given in Proposition 2 are satis…ed, then for any other coalition we can always …nd a scheme of allocating cost savings generated by the grand coalition, so that all members would be better o¤ if they form the grand coalition. Thus, starting from any coalition, three supply chain members ultimately decide to join the grand coalition under a fair allocation scheme. However, prior to …nding a fair allocation scheme, they would not stay with the grand coalition. In order to make the grand coalition stable, we need to …nd the fair allocation scheme. The analysis for this case is much more complicated. Similar to our analysis for two-player coalitions, we de…ne From De…nition 1, under a fair allocation scheme (imputation) none of the members should have any incentive to deviate from the grand coalition, which implies that the fair allocation scheme is undominated by any other possible scheme. Next, we discuss some commonly-used solution concepts in cooperative game theory, which can be classi…ed into two categories-set-valued and unique-valued solution concepts.
Since we are interested in a unique allocation scheme, we shall brie ‡y mention the set-valued solution concepts to show if the space of all possible fair allocation schemes is non-empty. In this category, each set-valued solution concept provides a set of fair allocation schemes that would make the grand coalition stable. For the imputation set, several solution concepts have been suggested, such as Aumann-Maschler bargaining set [2] , kernel [9] , the core [10] and the stable set [32] . Davis and Maschler [9] and Peleg [24] showed that Aumann-Maschler bargaining set is non-empty for all games, and the kernel is a subset of Aumann-Maschler bargaining set.
The stable set (a.k.a. von Neumann-Morgenstern solution) was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [32] . This solution concept can suggest an allocation scheme that makes the grand coalition stable, but it is used only for essential games where
For inessential games, we cannot apply the concept to …nd an allocation scheme.
Thus, for our paper, we don't consider the stable set. The core was …rst introduced by Gillies [10] . The core of an n-person cooperative game in characteristic form is de…ned as the set of all undominated imputations (x 1 ; x 2 ; : : : ; x n ) such that for all coalitions T N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, we
; see also Owen [23] for a description of the core. Davis and Maschler [9] also demonstrated that if the core for a game is non-empty, then it must be contained in AumannMaschler bargaining set. Although allocation schemes suggested by the core assure the stability of the grand coalition, the core could be empty for some games, thus making it impossible to …nd an allocation scheme by using this concept. Even if the core is non-empty, we face the question of which allocation scheme should be used for dividing total cost savings among three players (supply chain members).
We now discuss the solution concepts of Shapley value and the nucleolus, each suggesting a unique allocation scheme. Shapley value can be computed easily by using a formula regardless of whether or not the core is empty. However, when the core is non-empty, Shapley value may not be in the core. Moreover, if the stability of the grand coalition depends on some conditions, then the allocation scheme in terms of Shapley value may make the grand coalition unstable.
An alternative solution concept known as the "nucleolus", which was proposed by Schmeidler [27] , also de…nes an allocation scheme that minimizes the "unhappiness" of the most unhappy information sharing coalition. More speci…cally, let e T (x) = v(T ) P i2T x i denote the excess Compared with other concepts (e.g., the core and Shapley value), the nucleolus has several desirable properties: (1) A unique nucleolus solution always exists so that an allocation scheme can be devised for any game; (2) unlike Shapley value, if the core of a game is non-empty, the nucleolus solution is always in the core; (3) the solution always exists in Aumann-Maschler bargaining set for the grand coalition. For a discussion on these properties of the nucleolus solution, see Stra¢ n [31, p. 150] . However, since the nucleolus solution is normally found by solving a series of linear programming problems, in general, it may be di¢ cult to compute it analytically.
Solution of the Information-Sharing Cooperative Game
We now apply some of the relevant major solution concepts discussed in Section 3.2.1 to our game analysis. In particular, if a two-player coalition is stable, we use the Nash arbitration scheme and the Shapley value to …nd a unique allocation scheme; if the grand coalition is stable, we use the core to examine if a set of fair allocation schemes exists, and then use the concepts of Shapley value and the nucleolus to …nd a unique allocation solution.
Proposition 3 If a two-player coalition is stable, both Nash arbitration scheme and Shapley value suggest equal allocation of extra cost savings between two players, as given by the egalitarian proposal. As a result, a unique allocation scheme for each coalition is given as follows: If the coalition fi; (jk)g (i, j, k = M , D, R, and i 6 = j 6 = k) is stable, then a unique allocation scheme for splitting the cost savings v(jk) between players j and k is (
When the grand coalition is stable, we …rst investigate whether or not the core is empty. As McKelvey and Scho…eld [20] introduced the concept of constrained core to ensure stability of all coalitions in the constrained core. In our paper, we incorporate three constraints
x D ! D and x R ! R to guarantee the coalitional stability in the three-level supply chain. As a result, for our cooperative game, the constrained core is de…ned as a set of all undominated
This concept has been widely used in the economics, business and management …elds; see, for example, Boyd, Prescott and Smith [3] , Ligon and Thistle [19] and
Montesano [21] .
We now apply the constrained core to our game and obtain the following important result.
Theorem 1
The constrained core of the information sharing game in characteristic-function form is non-empty if and only if 2v
Even though a non-empty core can suggest some fair allocation schemes, the following question still arises: Which allocation scheme should be used for the supply chain under study? The concept of constrained core cannot provide us with further help in our search for a unique imputation which also results in the stability of the grand coalition. Next, we search for a unique allocation scheme in terms of shapley value and the nucleolus.
Proposition 4
The allocation scheme in terms of Shapley value is given as follows: Since Proposition 4 indicates that Shapley value may not assure the stability of the grand coalition, we now use the nucleolus solution to suggest a fair allocation scheme. As we shall show below, when the core of our game is empty, we can compute the nucleolus solution analytically without resorting to linear programming. With the inclusion of three stability-assuring constraints
, the result obtained is known as the constrained nucleolus solution which was introduced by Montesano [21] . Conceptually, this solution is the same as that of the (ordinary) nucleolus solution with the addition of constraints that assure stability of the coalition.
, the constrained core is empty and we have the constrained nucleolus solution
thus assuring the stability of the grand coalition.
If the constrained core is non-empty, then it would be very complicated to use the de…nition of nucleolus solution to obtain a closed-form formula. A commonly-used method of …nding the nucleolus solution is to solve a series of linear programming (LP) problems. The …rst LP model is written as min u,
where u denotes the "unhappiness" of the most unhappy player. Solving the above LP, we can …nd a solution where the most unhappy player's allocation has reached a value which minimizes the player's unhappiness. For this case, substituting the value into the above LP problem, we solve the resulting LP problem to minimize the "unhappiness" of the second most unhappy player. We can …nd the constrained nucleolus solution after minimizing the unhappiness of all players. For a detailed discussion of the LP approach, see Wang [33] .
Implementation of Unique Allocation Schemes
When only two players share information in a stable coalition (i.e., fM; (DR)g, fR; (M D)g or fD; (M R)g), Proposition 3 presents schemes for allocating cost savings between two players. To implement these schemes, we employ the concept of side payment, which is de…ned as the amount transferred between two players so that both players obtain their fair allocations suggested by Proposition 3.
Proposition 6
The allocation schemes suggested by Proposition 3 to allocate cost savings between two players are implemented as follows:
1. If the coalition fM; (DR)g is stable, then the side payment from the distributor to the retailer
2. If the coalition fR; (M D)g is stable, then the side payment from the manufacturer to the
3. If the coalition fD; (M R)g is stable, then the side payment from the manufacturer and the
When a side payment computed above is negative, the absolute side-payment amount is transferred in a reverse direction.
Next, we calculate the side payments transferred between any two players, when the grand coalition f(M DR)g is stable.
To that end, we …rst de…ne 
Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis with Simulation
We …rst present two numerical examples and illustrate the application of cooperative game theory in allocating cost savings among three players (when the grand coalition is stable) or between two players (when a two player coalition is stable). Table 2 . Using the results in Section 3.1, and those in Table 2 Table 2 , we …nd that the errors generated by this assumption are large, e.g., the percentage error for the retailer in the coalition fM; D; Rg is ( R1 ^ R )=^ R = 63:33%. (In our paper we de…ne an error as "large" when the percentage error exceeds 5%.) Thus, we cannot use expected costs under the 100% …ll-rate assumption to construct our cooperative game and …nd an allocation scheme. This demonstrates that, information sharing can achieve cost savings and improve supply chain performance. In order to illustrate the analysis for a stable two-player coalition, in the next example we assign a very small value to the autocorrelation parameter, i.e., = 0:02. Table 3 . For this example, we construct a cooperative game in characteristic form as 
The Impact of on the Coalition Stability and the Allocation Scheme
We perform a sensitivity analysis to examine the e¤ect of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient on the coalitional stability, total cost savings for the supply chain and allocations made to the members of the chain. In this sensitivity analysis, we …rst increase the value of from 0.01 to 0.1 in increments of 0.01, and then increase from 0.1 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1. The results are presented in Table   4 in Appendix D. Using the data in this table, we plot the allocations in Figure 2 As Table 4 indicates, we …nd that, for a constant = 20, higher values of the parameter generate higher total cost savings enjoyed by the entire supply chain. This result is expected since increasing raises the value of historical data according to the end-demand model (1). However, when 0:02, we …nd that the value of information is not substantial so that the three members (especially, the manufacturer) would be unwilling to join the grand coalition f(M DR)g. But, the end-demand information is still worth sharing between the distributor and the retailer, so the coalition fM; (DR)g becomes stable when assumes very small values. When the grand coalition is stable for > 0:02, we …nd that the core is always non-empty and the allocation scheme suggested by Shapley value makes the grand coalition unstable. In order to obtain a unique allocation scheme that achieves stability of f(M DR)g, we compute the constrained nucleolus solution, and use it to split total cost savings among three members. Figure 2 (a) indicates the allocations to three members when is increased from 0.01 to 0.1 in increments of 0.01. We note that the allocations to the distributor and the retailer are equal when is in this range. For a small value of (0.01 or 0.02), the distributor and the retailer stay in the two-player coalition (DR), since they can obtain savings that make these two members better o¤ than leaving the coalition. Moreover, the distributor and the retailer receive equal allocated savings, as suggested by Proposition 3. When increases from 0.03 to 0.1, the grand coalition f(M DR)g is stable, and the rise in the portion allocated to the manufacturer continues to be the fastest among three supply chain members. This is due to the fact that, for a larger , the supply chain experiences larger cost savings; but, in order to entice the manufacturer to stay within the grand coalition (i.e., to keep it stable), the manufacturer receives higher allocations. In Figure 2(b) we plot the changes on the allocations to three members when is increased from 0.1 to 1.0 in increments of 0.1. The savings allocated to the manufacturer continues to increase, but are less than those to the retailer when 0:9. This re ‡ects the fact that, according to (1), the retailer's end-demand information plays a more important role in improving supply chain performance when the value of is increased. Thus, increasing the value of allocates higher values to the retailer.
Especially, for those values that are set to 0.9 or higher, the retailer obtains a higher allocation than other members. We …nd that, when is greater than 0.4 but smaller than 0.9, the value of end-demand information held by the retailer increases but adds signi…cant value to the grand coalition, thus making this coalition stable. As a result, the allocation to the retailer is higher than that to the distributor but is still lower than the allocation to the manufacturer.
The Impacts of Shortage and Holding Costs on the Coalition Stability and the Allocation Scheme
We now investigate the coalition stability and allocation schemes when the shortage and holding costs parameters of each supply chain member are varied around their base values of (p R ; p D ; p M ) = 
The Impact of Unit Shortage Costs
We …rst examine the impact of the retailer's unit shortage cost p R on the allocation of total cost savings and compute allocation schemes in terms of the constrained nucleolus solutions. While other parameter values are unchanged, the value of p R is increased from 2 to 6.5 in increments of 0.5. Note that, since the unit shortage cost p R would be, in general, greater than the unit holding cost h R = 2, we let the minimum value of p R equal to 2. From Figure 3 (a), we …nd that the cost savings allocated to the manufacturer are constant. This result is justi…ed as follows: As the retailer's unit shortage cost p R increases and the unit holding cost h R is constant, the retailer has an incentive to increase his order quantity to minimize total inventory-related cost, which may raise the distributor's shortage cost if the quantity available to the distributor is not increased. However, the manufacturer's cost doesn't change since he is located at the highest echelon in the three-level As the value of p R increases, information sharing would generate more cost savings for this supply chain. Since the allocation to the manufacturer is the constant $17.71, the allocations to the distributor and the retailer increase in p R . However, when p R is smaller than 5, the distributor and the retailer have equal allocations; when p R is equal to or greater than 5, the retailer's enddemand information is so signi…cant that the allocation to the retailer is greater than that made to the distributor.
Similarly, we …nd that, as the value of the distributor's unit shortage cost p D increases from 1.5 to 6 in increments of 0.5, the allocation of total cost savings to the manufacturer is still the constant $17.71, and the allocations to the retailer and the distributor increase. Moreover, total cost reduction is higher than that computed as the value of p R changes; and the end-demand information sharing thus induces higher allocations of total cost savings to the retailer and the distributor. Di¤erent from Figure 3 To investigate the impact of the manufacturer's unit shortage cost p M on the allocation, we increase the value of p M from 1 to 5.5 in increments of 0.5. Figure 3(c) shows that as the value of p M increases, the allocation to the manufacturer increases whereas the allocations to other members decrease. In particular, increasing the value of p M entices the manufacturer to increase his order quantity, and the end-demand information sharing largely increases the cost savings incurred by the manufacturer. Since the distributor and the retailer bene…t from increasing the value of p M , they agree upon the signi…cant allocation to the manufacturer to keep the coalition f(M DR)g stable.
However, even though the allocations to the retailer and the distributor decrease, these two members are still better o¤ than leaving the grand coalition. Furthermore, when the value of p M is smaller than 2, the retailer's end-demand information adds a more signi…cant value to the grand coalition; thus, the allocation to the retailer is highest among three supply chain members. However, when p M is equal to greater than 2, the cost savings M 1 M 2 incurred by the manufacturer becomes very large. In order to prevent the manufacturer from leaving the grand coalition, the allocation to the manufacturer is increased to a high level, and the allocations to the retailer and the distributor are equal to a small value.
The Impact of Unit Holding Costs
We increase the value of the retailer's unit holding cost h R from 0.5 to 5 in increments of 0.5, compute the allocation schemes in terms of constrained nucleolus solutions and plot Figure 3 (d) to
show the impact of h R on the allocations of total cost savings. Similar to our analysis for Figure   3 (a), we …nd that increasing the value of h R has no impact on the allocation to the manufacturer.
Additionally, when the retailer's unit holding cost h R increases and the unit shortage cost is unchanged at p R = 5, the retailer intends to decrease his order quantity, and the probability that the retailer's order can be satis…ed by the distributor is increased. This implies that increasing the value of h R may reduce the shortage cost incurred by the distributor. Therefore, compared with the increase of h R , the end-demand information released by the retailer to the distributor is less important in improving the distributor's local performance, and thus cost savings generated by the information sharing is reduced, as shown by Figure 3(d) .
When the value of h R is smaller than 3, the end-demand information of the retailer is signi…-cantly important to supply chain improvement, so that the allocation of total cost savings to the retailer is higher than that to the distributor. However, when h R 3, the retailer's end-demand information becomes less important, and the distributor's cost savings generated by increasing the value of h R raises. Thus, the allocations to the retailer and the distributor are equal.
When the value of the parameter h D is increased from 0.5 to 2.75 in increments of 0.25, we compute the allocations of total cost savings and plot Figure 3 Next, we examine the impact of h M on allocation schemes by increasing the value of h M from 0.2 to 2 in increments of 0.2. When the value of h M increases, the manufacturer intends to reduce his order quantity, and the distributor's order cannot be ful…lled with a larger probability, which further reduces the possibility that the retailer's order is satis…ed by the distributor. Therefore, increasing the value of h M may increase the shortage cost at each supply chain member, and thus, the information sharing among three supply chain members is more important to improving supply chain performance. From Figure 3 (f) we …nd that, when the value of h M increases in the range [0:2; 1], the impact of h M is not signi…cant, so that the allocation to the manufacturer is increasing to re ‡ect the fact that the retailer and the distributor entice the manufacturer to stay in the grand coalition. For this case, the retailer and the distributor equally share the remaining savings. However, when h M > 1, the impact of h M is so large that the end-demand information sharing plays a more important role in supply chain improvement. In order to motivate the retailer to release the demand information, the allocation to the retailer increases in a large magnitude.
Since the cost savings M 1 M 2 (which is obtained by the manufacturer when leaving the grand coalition) is decreasing, the allocation to the manufacturer is also correspondingly reduced.
Conclusion
This paper developed an information sharing cooperative game in characteristic form and found an allocation scheme to share the cost savings arising from cooperation. More speci…cally, we considered a three-level supply chain involving a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer. The three supply chain members cooperate with each other in sharing the demand information under positive lead-times. Such a collaboration results in a cost reduction in the supply chain. We investigated the scheme of splitting the cost savings among the supply chain members. In particular,
we computed analytically the expected holding and shortage costs incurred at the manufacturer level, and used simulation to …nd expected costs of the distributor and the retailer. By using these costs, we found the characteristic values for all possible coalitions, and derived the necessary conditions for stability of every coalition. If a two-player coalition is stable, we presented a unique allocation scheme. When the grand coalition is stable, we showed that the constrained core of the game could be non-empty provided that a condition is satis…ed. Next, we considered Shapley value to determine a unique allocation of cost savings but found that this allocation scheme could result in an unstable grand coalition (since at least one of three conditions required for stability is not satis…ed). We then considered the nucleolus solution but in its computation we took into account three constraints that would keep the coalition stable. An analytic expression for the case of empty core was derived for solving the three-person game to …nd the constrained nucleolus solution. Our numerical study presented two examples to illustrate the modeling approach and the computations of allocation schemes, and also provided several sensitivity analyses to indicate the impacts of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient in model (1), the unit shortage and holding costs on the coalition stability and allocation schemes.
In our paper, we used the constrained core to examine whether the set of fair allocations is empty. However, a potential concern with using this concept as the stability criterion is that it is a myopic measure. A myopic solution assumes that the players don't consider the future; that is, they don't consider what might happen when they choose a solution. In addition, it is assumed that, when the players move to a myopic solution, there is no further deviation. Due to the limits of myopic solutions, two new concepts have been recently proposed to consider coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process with payo¤s generated as the coalitions evolve. The concept of "largest consistent set" introduced by Chwe [8] is a solution concept that is used to analyze "farsighted" coalitions that consider the possibility of other coalitions forming in response to its actions. Equilibrium process of coalition formation introduced by Konishi and Ray [13] allow for the possibility of moving to another coalition by the expectation of a higher future payo¤ and it is related to the largest consistent set of Chwe [8] . A future research direction could be the applications of the farsighted solution concepts in supply chain analysis.
Appendix A Computation of Each Supply Chain Member' s Expected Cost under 100% Fill Rate
We de…ne "end-demand" as the demand generated by the ultimate customer and assume that the end-demand is forecasted by the AR(1) process de…ned by (1) as in LST [17] . We assume that the parameter values and structure of (1) are known to all three members in the supply chain. As in LST [17] , is assumed to be signi…cantly smaller than d. This assumption will help justify the assumption that each supply chain member's order-up-to level is always nonnegative. The enddemand information that would be shared by the members is the deterministic value of " t ; that is, at the end of time period t, the retailer has already observed the end-demand realized in this period, i.e., D t . Since D t 1 is also available, the retailer can …nd the exact value of the error term
. Next, at the end of period t, the retailer forecasts the end-demand D t+1 and places an order with the distributor to increase the inventory position to his order-up-to level S R t . Hence, when there is no sharing of the end-demand information, the distributor and the manufacturer cannot compute " t exactly since they have no knowledge of D t 1 and D t . In this case, the distributor has to forecast the retailer's order by using the end-demand process (1), where " t is a normally-distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance 2 .
A.1 Retailer' s Expected Cost^
R under 100% Fill Rate
The demand process faced by the retailer is the AR(1) model (1). The retailer's order-up-level at the end of time period t, denoted by S R t , is found by minimizing total expected cost function for period t + 1 as follows. The mean m R t and the variance V R t of the demand D t+1 , conditional on the realized demand D t , are obtained as
Since " t+1 is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 , the demand process (1) implies that demand D t+1 is a normally distributed random variable with mean (d + D t ) and variance 2 .
Proposition 8 Assuming a 100% …ll-rate, the retailer's optimal order-up-to level, S R t , at the end of period t and minimum expected cost,^ R , for period t + 1 are
where k R =~ 1 p R = p R + h R ; h R and p R denote unit holding cost and the unit shortage cost per time period at the retailer level, respectively;~ ( ) is the distribution function of the standard normal r.v., and
is the unit normal loss function (see Porteus [25, Chapter 1] ).
Proof. Under the assumption of 100% …ll-rate, the retailer's order can be fully satis…ed by the distributor, so total expected cost^ R for period t + 1 is given aŝ
where (D t+1 ) is probability density function (p.d.f.) of the conditional normal random variable D t+1 with mean m R t and variance V R t . The optimal order-up-to level S R t that minimizes expected cost (6) can be obtained as
where k R =~ 1 p R = p R + h R , h R and p R respectively denote unit holding cost and the unit shortage cost per time period at the retailer level and~ ( ) is the distribution function of the standard normal r.v.; see LST [17] . Using the optimal value of the order-up-to level S R t , we …nd the minimum expected cost as (4).
When the …ll-rate is 100%, the retailer's order quantity Y R t at the end of period t is the di¤erence between the desired order-up-to level S R t and the starting inventory (S R t 1
Under the assumption that is signi…cantly smaller than d and as justi…ed by LST [17] , one can
show that Pr(Y R t < 0) is negligibly small; thus we assume that Y R t
0.
Next, we proceed with the analysis of the distributor's ordering decisions.
A.2 Distributor' s Expected Cost under 100% Fill Rate
Since the distributor is located in the middle of the three-level supply chain he could form a twoperson coalition with the manufacturer to share his demand information (the retailer's order), or cooperate with the retailer to share end-demand information. We consider the following two cases for analyzing the distributor's ordering decisions and inventory-related costs under 100% …ll-rate:
(i) No information sharing with the retailer leading to^ D1 , and (ii) information sharing with the retailer leading to^ D2 .
Prior to analyzing the two cases, we …rst develop the AR(1) model for characterizing the "demand process" (the retailer's order) faced by the distributor.
A.2.1 Retailer' s Order Process Faced by the Distributor
Since the retailer is the distributor's immediate downstream "neighbor", orders placed by the retailer constitute the "demand" faced by the distributor. In order to analyze the distributor's ordering decisions, we now derive the AR(1) model of the retailer's order process.
Lemma 1 Assuming a 100% …ll-rate, the retailer's order process faced by the distributor is a one-period autocorrelated process
where (7) with
In order to express Y R t+1 in terms of Y R t , we combine the expressions for Y R t+1 and Y R t to obtain
Since the error term is " R t+1 = (1 + ) " t+1 " t , where " t is normally distributed with zero mean and variance 2 , we …nd that " R t+1 is also a normally distributed random variable with the mean
and the variance
A.2.2 Distributor' s Expected Costs Under Di¤erent Coalitions
Assuming that the distributor's order can be fully satis…ed by the manufacturer, we compute the distributor's expected costs for the following two cases: (i) no information sharing from the retailer and (ii) information sharing from the retailer. The distributor now decides the order-up-to level S D t at the end of the period t by forecasting the retailer's order quantity for the period t + 1. In particular, we …nd the conditional mean and the variance of Y R t+1 , and then compute S D t that minimizes the distributor's expected costs (i.e., the holding and shortage costs) for the period t + 1.
Proposition 9
Assuming a 100% …ll-rate, the distributor's optimal order-up-to level (S D t ) at the end of period t and minimum expected cost (^ D ) for the period t + 1 are 
and k D , h D , p D are de…ned similarly to k R , h R and p R , respectively; " t is the realized value of the error term in the AR(1) demand process (1), and Y R t is the size of the order placed by the retailer at the end of the period t.
Proof. Under the assumption of 100% …ll-rate, we …nd the distributor's optimal solution and compute the corresponding expected cost as follows:
1. When the distributor doesn't share the demand information from the retailer under the coalitions fM; D; Rg, fR; (M D)g and fD; (M R)g, we know from (8) that the retailer's order quantity is an AR(1) process such that
" t , where Y R t is known to the distributor but " t+1 and " t are unknown. Due to no information sharing with the retailer, the distributor has to consider " t+1 and " t as two i.i. 
Thus, similar to the analysis in Section A.1, the distributor's expected cost for t + 1 iŝ
The optimal order-up-to level that minimizes^ D1 is found as
2. Under the coalitions fM; (DR)g and f(M DR)g, when the retailer discloses end-demand information (that is, the realized value of the error term " t ) to the distributor, the conditional mean m D2 t and the conditional variance V D2 t of the retailer's order quantity Y R t+1 are found as
In this case, the distributor's total expected cost for period t + 1 iŝ
As a consequence, the distributor's optimal order-up-to level that minimizes^ D2 becomes
Finally, simplifying^ D2 we have that
Next, we compute the order size of the distributor under the assumption of 100% …ll-rate. When the distributor joins one of the coalitions fM; D; Rg, fR; (M D)g and fD; (M R)g, the size of order that the distributor places with the manufacturer at the end of period t, denoted by Y D1 t , is the di¤erence between the desired order-up-to level S D1 t and the starting inventory (S D1 t 1
When the distributor joins one of the coalitions fM; (DR)g and f(M DR)g, the order quantity
is computed as the di¤erence between the desired order-up-to level S D2 t and the starting
A.3 Manufacturer' s Expected Cost
We now focus our attention on the ordering decisions at the manufacturer's level. In the three-level supply chain under study, the manufacturer is located at the highest echelon that is farthest from the ultimate customer. We assume that since the manufacturer produces the …nal product in the supply chain, the production quantity determined by him is fully realized. The demand faced by the manufacturer is the order received from the distributor. But the manufacturer may also share with the distributor the information regarding the orders received from the retailer, and/or share with the retailer the information regarding the end-demand. This results in …ve possible cases for sharing information between the manufacturer and the other members of the supply chain as discussed previously and depicted in Figure 1 leading to M 1 , M 2 , M 3 , M 4 and M 5 . Thus, we examine each situation to …nd the manufacturer's ordering decisions and compute the corresponding expected costs. Prior to analyzing the …ve cases, we investigate the distributor's order process.
A.3.1 Distributor' s Order Process Faced by the Manufacturer
Based on whether or not the distributor receives end-demand information from the retailer, we model two di¤erent order processes for the distributor.
No information sharing between the distributor and the retailer The results in this subsection will be used later to compute M 1 , M 3 and M 4 . We know from (9) that the distrib-
and from (8) that the retailer's order process is
We will use these results to characterize the distributor's order process in the AR(1) form.
Lemma 2 Assuming a 100% …ll-rate, the distributor's order process faced by the manufacturer, when the distributor and the retailer don't share end-demand information, is a one-period autocorrelated process
where " t+1 , " t and " t 1 are unknown to the distributor.
Proof. First, we write
For the case of no information sharing, the order size of the distributor for period t + 1 is thus
By using the retailer's order process, Y D1 t+1 can be expressed in terms of Y R t , i.e.,
where " D1 t+1 = (1 + ) 2 " t+1 (1 + ) " t . Combining (12) and (13) gives the AR (1) process of distributor's order in (11) .
Information sharing between the distributor and the retailer The results in this subsection will be used later to compute M 2 and M 5 .
Lemma 3 Assuming a 100% …ll-rate, the distributor's order process faced by the manufacturer, when the distributor and the retailer share end-demand information, is a one-period autocorrelated process
where " D2 t+1 = 2 + + 1 " t+1 (1 + ) " t and the forecasting error " t is known to the distributor but " t+1 is still unknown to both the retailer and distributor.
Proof. Similar to our analysis for the case of no information sharing, we re-write the distributor's order process in the setting of information sharing from (10) as (14) .
With the AR (1) process of the distributor's order, we can compute the manufacturer's ordering decisions and the corresponding costs for …ve cases mentioned previously. 
Similarly, we can write ! D and ! R as
Thus, the second condition for the stability of the grand coalition is v(M DR) ! M + ! D + ! R , which assures that no player has an incentive to leave the coalition.
2. The coalition fR; (M D)g would be stable only if the following two criteria are satis…ed:
(a) Similar to our analysis for the stability of grand coalition, total cost savings incurred by all members in this coalition are no less than those achieved in the grand coalition.
Speci…cally, the following conditions must be satis…ed:
(b) Each player in the two-player coalition (M D) will be worse o¤ if s/he leaves the coalition.
When a player leaves, the manufacturer and the distributor would have the cost savings v(M ) and v(D). In order to keep the two players in the coalition, we must have the
The analysis for the coalitions fD; (M R)g and fM; (DR)g is similar.
3. Obviously, the coalition fM; D; Rg is stable if any other coalition is unstable.
Proof of Proposition 3.
We …rst use Nash arbitration scheme to compute the allocation scheme. If the coalition fM; (DR)g is stable, the Nash arbitration scheme of allocating the cost savings between the distributor and the retailer is computed by solving 
satis…ed by the solution. As a result, the Nash arbitration scheme is the same as the egalitarian proposal. Similarly, we can …nd the Nash arbitration scheme for the other two-player coalitions.
Next, when the coalition fM; (DR)g is stable, we use Shapley value to allocate the cost savings v(DR) between the distributor and the retailer. Using the above formula, we have
Thus, the allocation in terms of Shapley value is also the same as that suggested by the egalitarian proposal. When we consider all stable two-player coalitions (i.e., fi; (jk)g, i, j, k = M , D, R, and i 6 = j 6 = k), we reach the allocation scheme.
Proof of Theorem 1. In a non-empty constrained core, an imputation (x M ; x D ; x R ) exists such that for all T fM; D; Rg,
, which assures that we can always …nd an allocation satisfying the three constraints. Since
Summing the three inequalities, we obtain that We now obtain the solution for the game with an empty core. As we described above, to …nd the nucleolus solution, we should make the excesses for all coalitions as small as possible. These excesses are given as follows: Table 4 : The impacts of the parameter on the coalitional stability and allocation schemes.
